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Abstract 
Weak state institutional capacity has been a notion intrinsically linked to development 
assistance and the good governance agenda, but has in recent decades emerged within 
a security setting, namely in respect to fragile states. Using the Copenhagen School‟s 
securitization framework, this paper examines fragile states as a threat in a Danish 
context, and looks at the measures employed to this extent. The analysis reveals a 
state-centric perspective inherent to the Copenhagen School‟s approach, leading to a 
discussion on the broadening conceptualization of security.  
  
 2 
Introduction 
Security is a key concept to the field of International Relations (IR), but the word in 
itself has great power. The Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies has 
underscored the importance of security in its articulated form, claiming that, when we 
speak of a subject in the context of security, we give it particular significance and 
further politicize the issue at hand. This is the basis behind the CS‟s theory of 
securitization, in which a securitizing agent (e.g. a state actor) asserts a matter as an 
existential threat to a referent object (e.g. the nation), wherefore it must be construed 
in a national security setting, allowing for extraordinary measures to be taken (Buzan 
et al, 1998, s. 23-27).  
 
In 2003, former Danish Minster of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller noted that 
“Development assistance is an integrated part of Danish foreign security policy” 
(Møller P. S., 2003), effectively ushering in a new phase for Danish development 
assistance. Against the backdrop of the war-on-terror in the 2000s, a new agenda rose 
to combat international terrorism with all instruments available. The weakness of 
fragile states was particularly perceived as a major root cause of terrorism, especially 
regarding the lack of institutional state capacity in these countries to ensure safety, 
stability, and socio-economic growth (Møller P. S., 2003). Many themes from the 
good governance agenda
1
 (promoted within the development assistance scene), which 
also dealt with state institutional capacity in providing basic services towards the civil 
sphere, were carried over to the fragile states agenda during this era. This has been 
witnessed most expressively regarding efforts to initiate state building
2
 in these 
fragile states through comprehensive approach strategies (samtænkingsstrategier) 
(UM, 2010). The weak institutional capacity of fragile states is contemporarily 
perceived as a source to insecurity and no longer solely relates to development 
assistance, indicating that a securitization of the subject has taken place.  
 
The emergence of fragile states as a threat, poses some interesting questions regarding 
our conceptualization of security. Security, in relation to threats, has traditionally 
been construed in a materialistic fashion, namely objective military capacities that can 
threaten a state‟s territory, sovereignty or interests (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 3-5).The CS 
argues though that several sectors
3
 can pose a threat to a referent object, and with the 
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addition of the securitization framework, threats are interpreted in a subjective 
manner (ibid: 27-29). Thus whilst the CS has brought new dimensions to the 
conceptualization of security, it still rings true in the ears of the traditional scene 
within security studies; the state‟s survival, to a large extent, is still considered the 
referent object (ibid: 4-5)  
 
Ken Booth, a scholar from the critical school of security studies, places the individual, 
rather than the state, at the forefront in his view of security, seeking to address the 
individuals of society whom live with insecurity, ill-health, poverty and low status 
(Booth, 2007, s. 98). Booth believes that security, in its common traditional 
understanding, has been conflated with the survival of the state, and thus does not 
address the roots of security, namely the potential to emancipate individuals (ibid: 
102).  
 
I believe the transition, that the notion of “weak state institutional capacity” has taken 
– from development assistance to security - warrants an examination. The CS‟s 
securitization approach appears to comply with this observation regarding fragile 
states, which I intend to investigate and affirm using the school‟s theoretical 
framework.  
 
The analysis serves as a platform to discussing the broadening of security, where I 
intend to illuminate that the CS‟s approach, ultimately is a state-centric analytical 
assessment, lacking broadening dimensions at the individual level.  
 
Problem Formulation 
I have developed the following research question(s) to guide my investigation. 
  
1) Why and how has the notion of “weak state institutional capacity”, which 
traditionally was associated with good governance, been securitized?  
2) And what can be deduced from such a securitization towards the broadening 
(conceptualization) of security? 
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Content of Chapters 
Below I will briefly outline the structure of this paper, where I introduce the content 
of each chapter.  
 
 Chapter one initiates with a section on methodology, where I will touch upon 
considerations, (de) selections, and limitations regarding my choice of theory and my 
empirical sources.  
 Chapter two (theory) elaborates upon the key aspects of the CS‟s framework 
in relation to this paper‟s research area. I also provide a brief overview of security in 
this section, and how it has traditionally been construed.  
 My third chapter consists of an analysis, wherein I trace the securitization 
process, define the referent object and the securitizing actors, and determine whether 
the securitization has been successful.  
 Chapter four is a discussion on my findings from the analysis, where I seek to 
address the second portion of my problem formulation. 
 The last chapter is a conclusion, where I summarize and highlight my key 
findings in relation to my problem formulation as a whole.    
Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodological considerations that went into the making of 
this paper. The section serves to justify my approach, whilst also indicating some of 
the limitations that are inherent to my research method.  
 
Internship  
This paper was written in conjunction with an internship at the Danish Defense 
College‟s Institute for Strategy. During the internship, I assisted colleagues in finding 
sources and data on the subject of Danish foreign policy. My interests, in the subject 
matter of this paper, thus sprung from these tasks.  
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Choice of Theory 
Having read articles on Danish comprehensive approach strategies during my 
internship, I identified a transformation of “weak state institutional capacity”, as a 
notion, which I wanted to explore in a security setting. The CS‟s securitization 
framework seemed as an obvious enabler to trace the transformation. My analysis of 
fragile states pointed towards the state, as the main securitizing actor in various ways. 
This fed into a discussion on the broadening of security as a concept, where I found 
the work of Ken Booth in an opposing position. This is the basis behind my report.  
 
I relied primarily on the major works from these two schools: Ken Booth‟s „Theory of 
World Security‟ from 2007, and the Copenhagen School‟s „Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis‟ from 1998, written collaboratively by Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde.  
 
Several conflicting views have been raised concerning both the CS and Ken Booth‟s 
approach, which I considered including in this report. I briefly outline these angles 
below.   
The Critical approach and Ken Booth 
Regarding Booth and the critical school, it is particularly important to note that a 
single and coherent critical approach, within security studies, has struggled to 
manifest itself 
4
. Nonetheless, I see validity in using Booth‟s approach, because he 
directly addresses the broadening of security and securitization in his major works; 
exemplifying his critique of the constructivist approach.  
Critiques of the Copenhagen School 
The CS‟s securitization framework has been critiqued from a number of angles. Rita 
Abrahamsen has been vocal in relation to the concept of emergency measures and the 
moment at which an issue ceases to be political. The CS is only occupied with the two 
distinctions of a political issue and a security threat, an either/or approach, as 
Abrahamsen highlights (Abrahamsen, 2005). Theirry Balzacq has underlined the 
importance that the audience plays in relation to the speech act. Balzacq points out, 
that by putting speech acts at the center of securitization, the approach misses out on 
the negotiation between the securitizing actor and the audience at whom the 
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articulation is directed, identifying that the speech act is only one part of the 
securitizing process (Balzacq, 2005).  
 
Various views regarding securitization can be found (Aradau, 2004) (Huysman, 1998) 
(McDonald, 2008) (Williams M. , 2003), but ultimately I have rejected to include 
these supplementary readings of securitization, considering their relevance in relation 
to the broadening of security.  
Data and sources 
In the following section I touch upon my empirical backdrop, and the selection 
criteria I have set up in this regard.  
Primary sources 
As the CS‟s framework entails an analysis of discourse and speech acts, I will 
naturally be analyzing speeches and policy documents. I have chosen exclusively to 
look at Danish sources in this regard, thereby also limiting the number of actors that I 
will examine. I have focused on speeches given by Danish Ministers, as I believe they 
can be viewed as a securitizing actor with broad impact on their audience(s). I looked 
at a number of speeches (Lidegaard, 2015) (Haarder, 2004) (Espersen, 2010), but 
focused exclusively on the early speech acts (a parliamentary inquiry from 2003), 
which captured the essence of the debate. I chose also to focus on the time period 
(2010), where fragile states were ushered into the Danish foreign policy domain. I 
have translated the Danish quotes to English on my own.  
 
In respect to policy papers, I have chosen to focus on Danish comprehensive approach 
strategies, because these documents exhibit the connection between security, good 
governance, and fragile states. The policy papers I relied on, are: “Danmarks 
samtænkte stabiliseringsindsatser i verdens brændpunkter (2013)”, and; “Fred og 
stabilisering, Danmarks politik for indsatser i skrøbelige stater (2010)”. 
 
Secondary sources 
I use a number of secondary sources in respect to concepts and historical events. I do 
not believe my choice of literature in this regard can be considered controversial, 
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seeing that I rely on books and articles that one could find in an IR or Development 
Studies course curriculum.  
 
Limitations   
The deepening and broadening of security is a theoretical discussion within IR that 
can be viewed from various (ideological) stances. In hindsight, the approach, which I 
have chosen, does not reflect multiple ideological stances, nor illuminate the 
evolution surrounding this discussion. One could also question whether the 
securitization of “weak state institutional capacity”, confined to a Danish angle, 
truthfully represents the discussion on a broadening conceptualization of security.  
Theory 
The following chapter is an introduction to the Copenhagen School‟s securitization 
framework, looking at the aspects relevant to this paper. Firstly though, I will look at 
security construed from a traditional perspective, providing some necessary context 
for the reader.  
Security from a Traditional Perspective 
The Westphalian system
5
 has been instrumental in shaping our understanding of the 
state and its role in an international setting. The concept of anarchy
6
 is to be 
understood in the Westphalian context; entailing a security game between states, 
where statesmen construct power politics (i.e. alliances, counter threats, etc.). The 
survival of the state becomes the objective in this regard, whereby military threats are 
the focus from a strategic perspective (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, s. 91). A well-
recognized definition of security studies, is that of Stephen Walt (shown below), as it 
adheres to the abovementioned notions and captures the essence of traditional IR 
thinking. 
 
 “Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of 
military force. It explores the conditions that make use of force more likely, the ways 
that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies 
that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent or engage in war.” (Walt, 1991) 
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These basic premises are the starting point for (neo) realists, where anarchy, the 
survival of the state, and military threats often take centerfold. Focus is very much on 
the structure in this sense; how the international system of anarchy influences states, 
and the decisions they must take in accordance to this reality
7
.  
 
Social Constructivism, the Copenhagen School and Securitization 
Social Constructivism 
It would be difficult to fully grasp the CS‟s approach to security, without a basic 
understanding of the social constructivist school from which they derive.  
 
In the previous section I touched upon the concept of anarchy, but Alexander Wendt 
famously noted in 1992, “anarchy is what states make of it”. For Wendt, anarchy is 
not a predetermined feature of the world order; rather it is a social construction that 
slowly has formed our understanding of security. Constructivists direct their attention 
to how actors shape the world (and vice versa), insisting that agents have identities 
that define their interests. These identities are formed based on shared beliefs, ideas 
and cultures. An example in this regard, is how democracy, as an idea, underpins the 
Western hemisphere and its identity; an identity, which has shaped the foreign policy 
of these nations.  Realists on the other hand find that states are identical units, with a 
similar goal to ensure their survival based on material interests (Agius, 2013, s. 88-
93).  
The Copenhagen School and Securitization 
The CS also finds that we (subjectively) construct the world, exemplified through the 
securitization framework (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 29-31). The CS accentuates though, 
that one condition must be prevalent: security must entail the survival of a referent 
object, defined as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival” (ibid: 36). 
 
The survival-based logic, from a traditional perspective, is thus still maintained, while 
they do expand on the categories within which we can construe security. The school 
identifies five sectors, and their corresponding referent objects: the military sector 
(the state); the political sector (ideology); the economic sector (trade and finance); the 
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societal sector (the collective identity); the environmental sector (the biosphere) (ibid: 
7).  
 
Referent objects within these sectors can be further politicized by securitizing actors 
(e.g. politicians, lobbyists, etc.
8
), moving them into a securitized domain. 
Securitization starts with the articulation (by a securitizing actor) of a referent object 
being threatened, which is called a speech act. Discourse is a central theme to 
securitization theory, namely in the sense that the audience must accept the speech act 
and the threat as such. From a CS perspective, securitization requires that a referent 
object has been articulated in a manner of being existentially threatened, hence giving 
the securitizing actor special privileges outside the realm of ordinary politics, also 
referred to as extraordinary measures. The extraordinary in this regard, is understood 
from the perspective of Carl Schmitt‟s executive unilateralism, defined by the 
securitizing actor‟s authority to decide whether there is an emergency, and delineate 
the measures of response (e.g. the implementation of exceptional security policies). 
The school argues though, that these emergency measures are not adopted in all cases 
of securitization. Some “steps” in addressing the existential threat must be taken 
nonetheless, which directly relate to the discourse surrounding the subject (Buzan et 
al, 1998, s. 23-26). Related, identifying the audiences‟ accept can be an ambiguous 
task prone to subjective interpretation from the analyzer. 
 
Supplementary to the expansion of sectors, the CS also identifies different levels, 
wherein one can theorize, which include: international systems (e.g. the planet), 
international sub-systems (e.g. the EU), units (e.g. the states), sub-units (e.g. lobbies), 
and individuals. The CS argues that there has been a tendency within IR, where level 
analysis has reinforced state-centric thinking, which they try to distance themselves 
from (ibid: 5-7).  
Sub-conclusion 
The CS finds that a threat assessment is subjective, depending on the shared 
understanding (actor and audience) of what constitutes a threat; a conviction based on 
the School‟s constructivist roots. The CS has expanded upon the sectors of analysis, 
though a referent object must be existentially threatened, wherefore survival is an 
important part of the securitization framework. Nonetheless, the CS contends the 
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notion, that states necessarily take centerfold in relation to the field of security 
studies.  
 
The framework can be broken down into four steps, characterizing 
 a securitization analysis: 1) speech acts, 2) categorizing the threat, 3) uncovering the 
extraordinary measures, and 4) identifying the audience‟s accept, indicating the 
successful securitization.  
 
In the following chapter, I will assess whether “weak state institutional capacity” can 
be interpreted as having been securitized, examining the speech acts, and identifying 
the threats and responses in this regard.   
Analysis  
Fragile States and the Good Governance Agenda 
Least-developed states, underdeveloped states, fragile states - throughout the years 
there has been numerous notions regarding state institutional deficiency in providing 
socio-economic development and basic services towards the civil sphere.   
 
In relation to Western foreign policy, “weak state institutional capacity” was a notion 
ordinarily linked to the good governance agenda prior to the 2000s (Kjær, 2004)
9
. The 
origins of the notion sprang from an economic developmental agenda, where 
particularly the World Bank (WB) has been a key stakeholder in shaping the field. 
(Cypher, 2010, s. 570-576)
10
.  
 
Daniel Kaufmann (former director at The World Bank Institute), can be attributed 
with having an enormous impact on our understanding of good governance. Below is 
one of Kaufmann‟s refined definitions.    
 
"(Good governance entails)...the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
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that govern economic and social interactions among them." (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Zoido-Lobatón, 1999, s. 1) 
 
We find these notions of institutional capacity and the provision of basic services also 
in regard to definitions surrounding fragile states. For all intents and purposes, to 
demonstrate this link, the WB provides a decent working definition of fragile states in 
relation to weak performance on two scales: “(i) State policies and institutions are 
weak in these countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services 
to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and 
accountability. (ii) They face risks of conflict and political instability.” (World Bank, 
2005)  
 
The good governance agenda can be interpreted as the precursor to the agenda on 
fragile states, where many similar themes regarding weak state institutional capacity 
were transferred over. Barry Buzan, from the CS, argues that the state consists of 
three components: a physical base, the idea of the state, and its institutional capacity 
(Buzan, 1991). Fragile states might be lacking in one or more of these categories, but 
the institutional factor is imperative, when looking at the dynamics behind political 
instability, insecurity and turmoil in these states. Particularly the monopoly on 
violence is difficult for fragile states to maintain, attributed to their lack of legitimacy 
in providing basic services. The weak institutional capacity of fragile states is hence 
viewed as a major contributor to conflict and insecurity (Patrick, 2006, s. 29).  
 
The Securitization of “Weak State Institutional Capacity” 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, development 
assistance took on a fundamental new track. The war-on-terror became a top policy 
priority, and development assistance was brought into this arena, as yet another tool to 
thwarting terrorism (Chandler, 2007). Afghanistan was the prime example, of how a 
neglected and fragile state, had become a breeding ground for terrorists (Williams D. , 
2008)
11
.  
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At a 2003 parliamentary inquiry, former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig 
Møller, spoke of good governance (and hence also weak state institutional capacity) 
in a very different context than previously witnessed.  
 
“The international society has established that terrorism constitutes a serious threat 
towards international peace and security (…) The long-term efforts against terrorism 
requires the dedicated application of development assistance (…) The poorest (in this 
world) will face difficult and worse conditions, if terrorist groups manage to collapse 
already fragile states. For this reason we will be supporting development, the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance” (Møller P. S., 2003) 
 
This quote exemplifies the notion of weak state capacity and good governance‟s 
transition quite expressively; in a few years, the context shifted from development 
assistance, to security and terrorism. When Møller expresses that terrorism poses a 
direct “threat to international peace and security”, we witness a speech act, where 
terrorism is articulated as an existential threat towards the Danish state as a referent 
object, indicating that the threat relates to the military sector. Danish Prime Minister 
at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, expressed his view, during the same 
parliamentary inquiry, regarding this subject.  
 
“Combating international terrorism is an essential element in respect to defending 
our democratic values. International terrorism challenges exactly the values on which 
our society is based. The fight against terrorism is therefore an effort to defending our 
democratic standards” (Rasmussen A. F., 2003) 
 
Rasmussen stated in this instance, that our values as a democratic nation were 
threatened by terrorism. From a CS perspective, this is a speech act, which establishes 
that the Danish democratic ideological basis is existentially threatened by terrorism, 
requiring that we “defend our democratic standards”. In this context one would 
characterize this threat in regard to the political sector.  
 
Effectively, the Liberal Danish government, during this era, was conceiving weak 
state capacity in relation to security, namely in the context of terrorism. This was 
further emphasized in the latter-half of the 2000s, where policy papers on fragile 
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states were implemented (UM, 2010). When Søren Pind was Minister of 
Development in 2010, he ushered in this new agenda, establishing a direct link 
between fragile states and the threat they pose to “our” security:  
 
“Fragile states have a real bearing on regional security and even on our own 
security” (Pind, 2010) 
 
From these quotes we gather, that the referent object is the Danish state, instituting 
that fragile states are a threat towards international peace, and “our” security, whether 
this may be in relation to the military or political sector. State deficiencies in 
providing basic services towards the civil sphere had become an issue of security, 
rather than a notion solely confined to good governance and development assistance.  
 
The securitizing actors, in these instances, are state actors at a top-political level. 
When Rasmussen, Pind and Møller speak of security in this context, it is in the 
traditional sense, linking to a state-centric perspective. As a state representative they 
are speaking of security, in the context of the Danish nation, thus relating to the state 
unit regarding the analytical level.  
 
These speech acts do not directly address good governance and weak state capacity in 
a securitization setting, the link is to be found in the measures employed to handle this 
threat. Above I have established the first two steps of securitization (1) identifying the 
speech acts given by Danish state actors, and (2) categorized the threat of fragile 
states towards the Danish state as a referent object, within the political and military 
sectors. We now turn to the responses - from a policy perspective - that were 
witnessed in relation to these threats (steps 3 and 4). 
 
The Security-Development Nexus 
Contemporarily, development and security are construed to be intertwined, dubbed 
the security-development nexus. In short, the nexus builds on the notion that the 
malaise of development, poverty and weak state capacity, are now interpreted, by 
donors and international organizations, as themes that are sources to insecurity 
(Duffield, 2001)(Haarder, 2004). 
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Danish comprehensive approach strategies were adopted during the Afghanistan 
intervention, to address the link between security and development (Rasmussen M. 
V., 2011). These strategies build on a premise that: with the integrated development 
of strategies, coordination, implementation and evaluation across ministries (and the 
military-civil sphere), “donors” are more likely to achieve lasting democratic peace 
and build stable nations (Jakobsen, 2014)  
 
Denmark has made state building a key priority in regards to comprehensive 
approaches in fragile states, with good governance elements embedded within. 
Building effective institutions and state capacity, is imperative to combatting conflict, 
poverty, insecurity and violations against human rights, according to the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UM, 2010, s. 10-13).   
 
Denmark will concentrate its efforts on five priority areas, where the needs of fragile 
states are especially daunting: (1) security and stability; (2) bettering of living 
standards and economic opportunity; (3) democratic development, good governance 
and human rights; (4) conflict prevention, and; (5) regional conflict management. 
(UM, 2013, s. III) 
 
Shown above are the key priorities inherent to Danish comprehensive approaches, 
where it is revealed that good governance plays a central part. From these policy 
papers there is a clear indication that security cannot be guaranteed in fragile states 
without addressing weak state institutional capacity through good governance and 
state building.  
 
The Successful Securitization  
Comprehensive approach strategies, from a CS perspective, are to be interpreted as 
the extraordinary measures employed in response to the articulated threat, based on a 
notion that security and development are a nexus.  
 
Comprehensive approach strategies are a new phenomenon within Danish foreign 
policy, blending civil and military dimensions
12
, a measure never witnessed before in 
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respect to Danish foreign policy. Previously weak state institutional capacity was 
addressed in the political realm of development assistance, but contemporarily also 
entails questions surrounding security. There lays a direct security objective within 
these strategies, deviating from an exclusively political goal; hence they can be 
construed as an exceptional security policy.  
 
Turning to the subject of the audience‟s accept - which is notoriously difficult to 
measure (even public polls lack the necessary depth) – I will now provide some 
indicators that portray accept towards these strategies (as a measure). Breaking it 
down into two categories might be useful in this regard, looking at the military and 
civil dimensions separately. 
 
Firstly, Danish public support towards the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
shifted throughout the 2000s (Jørgensen, 2011), but had frequently been more positive 
compared to European allies engaged in the same wars  (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 
2015). Even after 10 years of engagement in Afghanistan, there was still a dominant 
public support towards the invasion and Danish efforts in this regard; indicating that 
some level of legitimacy in the public eye was maintained throughout (Schøtt, 2013). 
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, from the Danish Defense College, argues that there has been 
an atypical high accept and Danish support towards these wars, considering that 
despite the many losses with these interventions, there was still broad parliamentary 
and public support (Jakobsen, 2015). These factors portray a public consent towards 
the military dimensions. 
 
The civil dimensions can be measured in relation to Danish public support towards 
aid assistance, considering the development schemes inherent to comprehensive 
approach strategies. A signifier of Danish international aid is the comparatively high 
level of contributions measured in GNI, which has been maintained above the 0.7% 
United Nations recommended threshold (Klarskov & Thobo-Carlsen, 2015). The most 
recent cutbacks regarding Danish development assistance, has not resonated very well 
with the public, garnering less than 50% support (Kaasgaard, 2015). These aspects 
indicate that the Danish public is in support of development assistance broadly, 
viewing this field as an important policy-priority.  
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Sub-conclusion  
I will now assess what the analysis reveals concerning the first part of my problem 
formulation: Why and how has the notion of “weak state institutional capacity”, 
which traditionally was associated with good governance, been securitized? 
 
Four particular elements can be gathered from the analysis:  
 
1. Weak state institutional capacity, as a notion, has its origins within the 
politicized domain of development assistance, specifically regarding the 
good governance agenda. The emergence of the war-on-terror during the 
2000s brought on a securitization of the field. 
2. The main securitizing actors have been top-political state figures, which 
have dominated the discourse on the subject.  
3. The analysis reveals that fragile states are perceived as the threat, and the 
Danish state and its democratic ideology are the referent objects, hence 
relating to the military and political sectors.  
4. The implementation of comprehensive approach strategies, demonstrates 
the extraordinary measures adopted in relation to the threat. There are 
indications that there has been accept towards these measures by the 
Danish public as an audience.  
 
 
Addressing the why segment of the problem formulation: the notion of “weak state 
institutional capacity” has been securitized, because fragile states are viewed as a 
threat in respect to the military and political sector.  
 
Looking at the how segment of the problem formulation: the securitization has been 
undertaken by Danish ministers, and the successful securitization is indicated, by the 
notion‟s incorporation into comprehensive approach strategies and the Danish public 
accept of these measures employed.  
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Discussion 
My analysis has revealed first and foremost, that the notion of weak state capacity has 
been brought into a security setting. The securitization builds on a notion, that fragile 
states foster terrorism in the long run, and thus „bad governance‟ is a threat in itself to 
Western states. Good governance is viewed as a state building tool in comprehensive 
approach strategies, whilst it is also a desired end-state to be accomplished in fragile 
states.  
 
“We want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to 
referent objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are non-military as well 
as military.” (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 4) 
 
I believe that the securitization of “weak state institutional capacity” complies with 
the CS‟s quote above. The securitization unveils that threats do not necessarily have 
to be objective, materialistic and confined to a military dimension, considering that 
weak state institutions do not pose a traditional threat in terms of military power
13
.  
 
Turning to the theme of subjectivity vs. objectivity in relation to threats, both 
dimensions should be highlighted in this instance. Terrorists pose a real objective 
threat towards Western societies
14
, nonetheless the framing of weak states as a threat, 
bears subjective characteristics. Danish ideas of what constitutes an effective/secure 
state, are embedded in our identity as a democratic nation. This emphasizes, why 
particularly good governance (based on liberal values), is viewed as a tool in 
thwarting the weakness of fragile states (see footnote 1). Ultimately the tagging of 
“fragile states pose a threat” is a subjective interpretation undertaken by Danish state 
figures, which validates the effect that agency plays in relation to determining priority 
areas for foreign policy, and the identity and ideas behind these decisions.  
 
Broadening Security? 
Reverting to the theme of security‟s broadening conceptualization; the securitization 
analysis reveals that the CS‟s framework is state-centric. Securitization involves 
discourses, and in the context of national foreign policy, state-actors dominate this 
scene. Booth finds the securitization framework to be elitist
15
, because “those without 
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discourse-making power are disenfranchised, unable to join the securitization game” 
(Booth, 2007, s. 166). I find this to be true, when looking at good governance and 
fragile states from a securitization angle. Danish ministers have been instrumental in 
articulating fragile states in a security setting, and have done so in relation to the 
Danish state. The analytical level resides at the state unit level, when Danish ministers 
speak of “fragile states pose a threat towards international peace and security”. It is 
somewhat contradictory, when the CS claim that the “The unit level can encompass 
much more that states” (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 7), whilst also pointing out that state-
actors are most likely to succeed in securitizing a subject, based on their legitimacy in 
a societal context (Emmers, 2013, s. 134).This is a point further underscored with the 
CS‟s emphasis on extraordinary measures, which very much puts state actors in 
control, seeing that these securitizing actors, have the sole capability in implementing 
the executive exceptional security policies. The implementation of comprehensive 
approach strategies has been a state decision and portrays the direct actions taken in 
relation to „fragile states as a threat‟.    
 
Whilst we can interpret fragile states as a “new” subjective threat and expand on the 
sectors of analysis, at the end of the day, not much has been broadened upon, as the 
CS initially set out to accomplish (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 5, 7 & 39).  
 
“We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but by 
exploring the logic of security itself (…) The need is to construct a conceptualization 
of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or 
problem.” (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 5) 
 
By setting these parameters (something more than just any threat) in their framework, 
the CS limits the extent to which we can broaden our conceptualization of security. I 
am limited to identifying broadening dimensions, because security is being conflated 
with survival (existential threats), ultimately returning to the state-centric domain. 
The CS clearly express, that they do not intend to construct a framework that 
incorporates the individual human life (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 21)
16
. I believe Ken 
Booth has a valid point when he questions the CS‟s pursuit to broaden security‟s 
conceptualization, considering the disregard towards the individual level (Booth, 
1991, s. 313).   
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In the words of International Relations scholar, Robert Cox, theory is “always for 
someone and for some purpose”. Critical theory, in the view of Booth, sees the 
„someone‟ as the common humanity, whilst the „purpose‟ is emancipation (Mutimer, 
2013, s. 75). Behind the smoke and mirrors, of political ideology, lies the core of 
security, those peoples whom live with insecurity, ill-health, poverty and low status 
(Booth, 2007, s. 98). The goal with critical theorizing is to identify the problems with 
the status quo and replace dysfunctional power relations and their institutions (ibid: 
46-49)
17
. Emancipation and linking security to the individual broadens the 
conceptualization of security, beyond the dogmatic traditional angles, according to 
Booth. The analytical starting point for Booth centers on emancipation and the 
individual, and thus is very different from the state centric and anarchical 
understanding.  
I believe that such an analysis, starting at the individual level, is more true to the goal 
of broadening our understanding of security. While a CS approach is valuable in 
demonstrating how we subjectively interpret threats, ultimately their analytical 
approach reverts to a traditional sense of security, namely in relation to survival and 
threats toward the state.   
Sub-conclusion 
If we turn to the second portion of my problem formulation, some key findings can be 
highlighted. What can be deduced from such a securitization (of fragile states) 
towards the broadening (conceptualization) of security? 
 
1. Firstly, the securitization of fragile states supports the idea that security may 
not necessarily be confined to objective military threats, as advocated by the 
traditionalists.  
2. The weakness of states as a threat towards the referent object of the Danish 
state is a subjective interpretation of what constitutes a threat, which is based 
on the shared understanding between the securitizing actor and the audience. 
3. The securitization of “weak state institutional capacity” is primarily to be 
conceived within the unit level and state-centric domain, because 
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extraordinary measures and survival are integral elements to the CS‟s 
framework.  
4. Related, top-political Danish ministers, as key stakeholders, have dominated 
the discourse on this subject and have securitized at the state level. With state-
actors having been instrumental in shaping the subject and the necessary 
response, there has been an elitism surrounding the subject.  
5. Regarding the broadening conceptualization of security, Booth has some 
valuable commentary, by focusing on the individual level. Booth seeks to 
distance himself from the traditional conceptualization of security, by 
rejecting the conflation of security with the survival of the state. Emancipation 
and “the individual” provide a wider analytical starting point regarding the 
broadening of security. Such an analysis would have been difficult (if not 
impossible) to conduct in regards to the securitization framework.  
 
Conclusion 
In this report I have investigated the transition of weak state institutional capacity, as 
a notion, into the security domain, and evaluated what such a transition unveils 
regarding the broadening of security.  
 
From a CS perspective I have shown how state actors have securitized the subject, 
where the implementation of comprehensive approach strategies effectively have 
brought upon a successful securitization of the subject matter. This securitization is to 
be interpreted against the backdrop, that fragile states are subjectively interpreted as a 
threat towards the Danish state and its ideology as a referent object. 
 
In regards to the broadening of security, some key findings have been highlighted. 
Subjective interpretations to what constitute a threat, is underscored by the 
securitization framework, indicating that security not necessarily be equated with 
military issues and the use of military force. Agency, in terms of identity, has an 
important role in this regard, shedding light upon the confinement with a structural 
anarchic approach. Nonetheless, the broadening dimensions to the CS‟s approach can 
be questioned. With securitization‟s heavy emphasis on survival, extraordinary 
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measures, and discourse analysis, state-centricity characterizes the CS‟s approach. 
The inherent Schmittian logic, and the dominance of state-actors in a discourse 
setting, reveals the limitations imposed by the CS.  
 
Securitization is difficult to perceive across all analytical levels, particularly regarding 
the individual level. I believe that Ken Booth‟s vision and theoretical approach, truly 
seeks to broaden our conceptualization of security itself, distancing himself from state 
centricity and the conflation of security with the survival of the state. An analytical 
framework that addresses the individual level, as Booth proposes, is truer, in my view, 
towards the goal of broadening security beyond the traditional school.  
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Appendix  
                                                 
1
 Broadly speaking, good governance refers to the institutional capacity and 
accountability of the state to provide certain basic services towards the civil sphere. In 
the late 1980s, aid-donors identified the importance of institutions, in relation to 
development and socio-economic growth. The good governance agenda, promoted 
primarily by the World Bank, emerged as an institutional economic agenda, but 
evolved in the 1990s into an arena, wherein donors sought to promote democratic and 
liberal values (Kjær, 2004). 
2
 The notion is explained as the political process of establishing a societal identity and 
community, based on inclusive political processes, and common norms and rules. 
Ensuring trust from the civil sphere towards stabile and legitimate institutions is key 
in this respect, which ties to the aforementioned idea that the state has an obligation to 
provide a set of basic services (i.e. law, order and security) towards economic and 
social development (UM, 2010). 
3
 Five sectors were identified by the Copenhagen School: military, political, 
economic, societal, and environmental.  
4
 The individualist research agendas within this field, has disabled a network between 
these scholars to form, though attempts have been made to unify the field (i.e. the 
C.A.S.E Collective: 2006). 
5
 The Peace of Westphalia refers to a doctrine signed in 1648, which concluded the 
Thirty Years‟ War. During this conference, European states agreed to respect the 
sovereign and territorial integrity of one another, effectively entailing equality 
between states (no matter size or wealth) and their recognition as such (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2007, s. 91). 
6
 In IR, anarchy is the notion of a leaderless world order, hence there is no entity 
entitled to i.e. resolve disputes and enforce law/order. Principally, there is no 
sovereign above the state, nor a hierarchy between states (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, 
s. 66).  
7
 One can argue that this is predominantly the starting point for neo-realists (structural 
realism). 
8
 The CS argues that whilst non-state actors can take on the role of securitizing actors, 
it is usually state-actors that are most likely to succeed, as they are legitimate in the 
eyes of the audience (Emmers, 2013, s. 134) 
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9
 Throughout the 1990s, donors construed good governance in relation to democracy 
and liberal values. Good governance became synonymous with human rights, 
transparency, and free & fair elections for example (Møller P. S., 2002) 
10
 Tracing the origins of good governance, it is important to note, that the concept ties 
to the broader scene of development assistance, and the liberal economic ideology 
that has formed this field. Broadly speaking, the WB has promoted models that saw 
market-led export economies as the ideal (in contrast to the state-led agendas). For 
instance, the Washington Consensus was spearheaded by the WB, which underscored 
global economic integration and privatization, as strategies, key to development and 
growth. The Washington Consensus was first coined 1989, and encompasses 10 
general neo-liberal policies, ranging from privatization of state enterprises, to trade 
liberalization, to a broader fiscal policy (Cypher, 2010) (Kjær, 2004). 
11
 Underpinned by a neo-conservative conceptualization, development was seen as a 
pre-emptive measure towards security. Core to the neo-conservative mindset, is the 
notion of an activist foreign policy, while a dominant state fosters the necessary 
conditions for market growth. In relation to development assistance, promoting 
democratic values became a central theme (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007).  
12
 It could be argued though, that relating these strategies in relation to the strict 
Schmittian perspective is an overstatement. Rita Floyd has a valid point when 
highlighting that, the “extraordinary” and the “exceptional security policy” 
categorization lacks specificity. Ultimately, “exceptionality” boils down to the 
analyzers subjective interpretation of what constitutes such extraordinary measures 
(Floyd, 2015). 
13
 Traditionally, realists have only focused on „weak states‟ in relation to alliance-
formation (bandwagoning), and have not perceived them as a threat in themselves 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). Interesting to note in this sense, is that security is 
construed concerning the weakness of states, rather than the strength of states (i.e. a 
Cold War setting) (Breitenbauch, 2014, s. 34). 
14
 It is interesting to note that if the war-on-terror takes centerfold in one‟s analysis, a 
traditionalist argument can be underscored. Realist scholar Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 
from the Danish Defense College, notes that the strategic objective with Denmark‟s 
war-on-terror, mainly has been to form a tight alliance and partnership with the USA. 
This ties to Denmark‟s interests as a small nation to form alliances with greater 
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nations, as well as an activist strategic culture that Denmark has practiced for several 
years (Jakobsen, 2015) (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015). Interestingly, one could 
interpret the securitization of good governance in relation to a realist perspective, and 
the alliance objectives/interests that were inherent to the war-on-terror.  
15
 Lene Hansen shares this view, and has voiced that those outside the discourse are 
silenced (Hansen, 2000) 
16
 A major concern, for the Copenhagen School, when they set out to create the 
securitization framework, was to maintain the intellectual coherence of the security 
studies field (Buzan et al, 1998, s. 4). Against this backdrop, it is quite clear that the 
Copenhagen School incorporated survival and existential threats into their framework, 
so as to adhere to the traditional perspective within security studies. 
17
 This relates to a mindset inherent to critical theory, namely that theory should seek 
to go beyond existing knowledge and reveal underlying power relations (Collins, 
2013, s. 75) 
